Things have been developing in rather interesting ways in our “Evolution and Design” seminar. We have worked our way through all of the articles/papers and books in our required reading list, along with several in the recommended list. Before I summarize our “findings”, let me point out that for most of the summer our seminar has consisted almost entirely of registered students (all but one undergrads, with one employee taking the course for credit), plus invited guests (Hannah Maxson and Rabia of the Cornell IDEA Club). Two other faculty members (Warren Alman and Will Provine) attended for a while, but stopped in the middle of the second week, leaving me as the only faculty member still attending (not all that surprising, as it is my course after all - however, at this point I view my job mostly as facilitator, rather than teacher).
Anyway, here is how we’ve evaluated the books and articles/papers we’ve been “deconstructing”:
Dawkins/The Blind Watchmaker: The “Weasel” example is unconvincing, and parts of the book are somewhat polemical, by which we mean substituting assertion, arguments by analogy, arguments from authority, and various other forms of non-logical argument for legitimate logical argument (i.e. based on presentation and evaluation of evidence, especially empirical evidence). Dawkins’ argument for non-telological adaptation (the “as if designed” argument), although intriguing, seems mostly to be supported by assertion and abstract models, rather than by empirical evidence.
Behe/Darwin’s Black Box: The argument for “irreducible complexity”, while interesting, appears to leave almost all of evolutionary biology untouched. Behe’s argument is essentially focused on the origin of life from abiotic materials, and arguments for the “irreducible complexity” of the genetic code and a small number of biochemical pathways and processes. Therefore, generalizing his conclusions to all of evolutionary biology (and particularly to descent with modification from common ancestors, which he clearly agrees is “strongly supported by the evidence”) is not logically warranted. Attempts to make such extensions are therefore merely polemics, rather than arguments supported by evidence.
Dembski/The Design Inference and “Specification: The Pattern that Signifies Intelligence”: Dembski’s mathematical models are intriguing, especially his recent updating of the mathematical derivation of chi, his measure for “design” in complex, specified systems. However, it is not clear if empirical evidence (i.e. counted or measured quantities) can actually be plugged into the equation to yield an unambiguous value for chi, nor is it clear what value for chi would unambiguously allow for “design detection.” Dembski suggests chi equal to or greater than one, but we agreed that it would make more sense to use repeated tests, using actual designed and undesigned systems, to derive an empirically based value for chi, which could then be used to identify candidates for “design” in nature. If, as some have suggested, plugging empirically derived measurements into Dembski’s formula for chi is problematic, then his equation, however interesting, carries no real epistemic weight (i.e. no more than Dawkin’s “Weasel”, as noted above).
Johnson/The Wedge of Truth: To my surprise, both the ID supporters and critics in the class almost immediately agreed that Johnson’s book was simply a polemic, with no real intellectual (and certainly no scientific) merit. His resort to ad hominem arguments, guilt by association, and the drawing of spurious connections via arguments by analogy were universally agreed to be “outside the bounds of this course” (and to exceed in some cases Dawkins’ use of similar tactics), and we simply dropped any further consideration of it as unproductive. Indeed, one ID supporter stated quite clearly that “this book isn’t ID”, and that the kinds of assertions and polemics that Johnson makes could damage the credibility of ID as a scientific enterprise in the long run.
Ruse/Darwin and Design (plus papers on teleology in biology by Ayala, Mayr, and Nagel): Both ID supporters and evolution supporters quickly agreed that all of these authors make a convincing case for the legitimacy of inferring teleology (or what Mayr and others call “teleonomy”) in evolutionary adaptations. That is, adaptations can legitimately be said to have “functions,” and that the genomes of organisms constitute “designs” for their actualization, which is accomplished via organisms’ developmental biology interacting with their environments.
Moreover, we were able to come to some agreement that there are essentially two different types of “design”:
• Pre-existing design, in which the design for an object/process is formulated prior to the actualization of that object/process (as exemplified by Mozart’s composing of his final requiem mass); note that this corresponds to a certain extent with what ID supporters are now calling “front-loaded design”, and
• Emergent design, in which the design for an object/process arises out of a natural process similar to that by which the actualization takes place (as exemplified by Mayr’s “teleonomy”).
In addition, the ID supporters in the seminar class agreed that “emergent design” is not the kind of design they believe ID is about, as it is clearly a product of natural selection. A discussion of “pre-existing design” then ensued, going long past our scheduled closing time without resolution. We will return to a discussion of it for our last two meetings next week.
As we did not use the two days scheduled for “deconstruction” of Johnson’s Wedge of Truth, we opened the floor to members of the class to present rough drafts/outlines of their research papers for the course. It is interesting to note that both papers so presented concerned non-Western/non-Christian concepts of “design” (one focusing on Hindu/Indian and Chinese concepts of teleology in nature, and the other on Buddhist concepts of design and naturalistic causation).
Overall, the discussion taking place in our seminar classes has been both respectful and very spirited, as we tussle with difficult ideas and arguments. For my part, I have come to a much more nuanced perception of both sides of this issue, and to a much greater appreciation of the difficulties involved with coming to conclusions on what is clearly one of the core issues in all of philosophy. And, I believe we have all come to appreciate each other and our commitments to fair and logical argument, despite our differences…and even to have become friends in the process. What more could one ask for in a summer session seminar?
P.S. An open invitation to the other members of the class: if any of the statements strikes you as unrepresentative of what has been happening, please post a comment to that effect here…and thank you for keeping me honest!
Allen, as an outsider to your course, may I congratulate you on what appears to be a very fair and balanced analysis of Intelligent Design. It gives me some hope that the participants rejected Johnson’s arguments as polemic. I do wonder how they consider Jonathan Wells’ arguments. Although I agree that his ‘claims’ have little relevance to Intelligent Design.
I also am encouraged by the findings by both sides that Dembski’s arguments may be mostly impractical when it comes to doing the actual calculations.
Comment by PvM — July 28, 2006 @ 1:57 am
Alright. It’s very dangerous for someone on one side of the question or other– and though we both like to think of ourselves as reasonable beings open to whatever the evidence shows, we do have rather well-defined leanings– to summarize something like a general evaluation of the topic. Partly a projection issue :), and partly I think that we’ve different ideas of what naturally follows from the few agreed-upon premises.
So I think it’s better if you characterize this as your final (or, final as of one week left in the course) evaluation rather than a class consensus. We did came to consensus on lots of things, but not these ones.
PvM–
I hate to disappoint, but your statements are (unwarranted) further extrapolations, and they don’t logically even follow from Allen’s.
Comment by Hannah — July 28, 2006 @ 8:22 am
In his paper on specification that you mention Dembski says:
“For a less artificial example of specificational resources in action, imagine a dictionary of
100,000 (= 105) basic concepts. There are then 105 1-level concepts, 1010 2-level concepts, 1015 3-
level concepts, and so on. If “bidirectional,” “rotary,” “motor-driven,” and “propeller” are basic
concepts, then the molecular machine known as the bacterial flagellum can be characterized as a
4-level concept of the form “bidirectional rotary motor-driven propeller.” Now, there are
approximately N = 1020 concepts of level 4 or less, which therefore constitute the specificational
resources relevant to characterizing the bacterial flagellum. Next, define p = P(T|H) as the
probability for the chance formation for the bacterial flagellum. T, here, is conceived not as a
pattern but as the evolutionary event/pathway that brings about that pattern (i.e., the bacterial
flagellar structure). Moreover, H, here, is the relevant chance hypothesis that takes into account
Darwinian and other material mechanisms. We may therefore think of the specificational
resources as allowing as many as N = 1020 possible targets for the chance formation of the
bacterial flagellum, where the probability of hitting each target is not more than p.”
Do you know what he means by saying there are 10^20 possible targets for the formation of the flageelum, because I can’t make head or tail of this statement.
Comment by Dene Bebbington — July 28, 2006 @ 10:30 am
Allen,
By “pre-existing design,” would it be fair to say that you’re describing pre-adaptation and co-option of previous features to new functions, as Kirschner and Gerhart describe in The Plausibility of Life, but with an ID spin to it?
Comment by Dan — July 28, 2006 @ 10:41 am
I have a problem with the two types of design mentioned:
The use of Mozart’s requiem as an example of Pre-Existing Design is hard for me to fathom. This is because you would have to convince me that it did not also fit the definition of Emergent Design. For example, how was Mozart able to overcome natural processes? Did an intelligent being front load the requiem in his brain? Perhaps you could just use an actual example of pre-existing design in the biological world, instead of this square peg in a round hole.
Another problem (perhaps I am reaching here) is that items in our natural world, that clearly rise out of natural processes could also fit the definition of pre-existing design. For example liquid water, has the potential, to become ice or gas before it actually does. Is water therefore an example of p
Comment by Mike Hannigan — July 28, 2006 @ 11:53 am
“For example, how was Mozart able to overcome natural processes?”
What makes you think he had to? There is a lot of reason to believe that physics is “open” rather than “closed”, and that mind can manipulate the open-ness of physics.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — July 28, 2006 @ 1:14 pm
Bartlett: What makes you think he had to? There is a lot of reason to believe that physics is “open” rather than “closed”, and that mind can manipulate the open-ness of physics.
Accepting your statement for the moment, then you seem to be saying that the mind can in fact be captured in regularity and chance processes?
Of course one does not need openness of physics for that.
What am I missing here? Remember that intelligent design is inferred from our inability to describe to sufficient detail how a particular system arose through natural processes of regularity and chance.
Comment by PvM — July 28, 2006 @ 2:52 pm
Hannah
I am not sure if they are unwarranted, the rejection of Johnson’s work as polemic seems quite relevant and one may wonder how the work of Wells would have done in the class. But as I explained, his contributions and claims seem to have only incidental relevance to the topic of ID.
The position on Dembski seems more interesting. His new ‘definition’ of CSI may have complicated further his attempts to infer design. Now we have something which ranges from negative to positive numbers, seems impossible to calculate and still shows the main problems with CSI namely that in order for something to exhibit CSI it needs to be improbable under all relevant hypotheses, and yet the improbability of the hypotheses also rule them out as explanations. In other words, any time something containst CSI we can in all fairness say that the hypotheses so far cannot explain the event/system. The moment however we formulate a plausible hypothesis of design, we run into the same problem, for it to be plausible it has to have high enough probability but high enough probability also kills CSI.
So let’s apply Dembski’s new definition and reject until we have done so, any attempts to claim that 1) there are systems in biology that contain CSI 2) that CSI can be explained by intelligent design relevant hypotheses.
Otherwise, it seems to me that ID is merely a placeholder for “we have not yet found a hypothesis which explains the system” and we will know when CSI drops to a negative number which means that the hypothesis’s probability is sufficiently high.
Does this make sense?
And given the problems applying the old definition of CSI to any non trivial systems, how well do you believe the new definition will do?
In fact, ID seems to be not much dissimilar from IFF we were given infinite knowledge about processes of chance and regularity and IFF intelligent design is the complement of these two, THEN we can infer from the impossibility of hypotheses based on chance and regularity, a concept called intelligent design where such an inference is at least reliable. Of course, we still need to resolve 1) the step from id to agency and 2) the meaning of id, which may very well be an empty set.
Comment by PvM — July 28, 2006 @ 3:08 pm
“then you seem to be saying that the mind can in fact be captured in regularity and chance processes?”
Nope. If physics is _open_, then what the mind is doing is neither necessarily regular nor probabilistic.
“Remember that intelligent design is inferred from our inability to describe to sufficient detail how a particular system arose through natural processes of regularity and chance.”
Incorrect. That is only one step.
ID _matches_ a given product or system to what is the _expected_ product of mind. Codes and symbols are expected products of mind. Holistically designed systems are expected products of mind.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — July 28, 2006 @ 3:09 pm
Bartlett: ID _matches_ a given product or system to what is the _expected_ product of mind. Codes and symbols are expected products of mind. Holistically designed systems are expected products of mind.
So we are now moving away from the concept of specified complexity and ID looks at what are expected products of mind. Of course, ID presents no positive hypotheses as to what are expected products of the mind. Calling it ‘holistically designed systems’ is not going to resolve this matter.
Perhaps you can explain to us what you mean by ‘if physics is open’?
Taner Edis has written an excellent paper showing that regularity and chance can actually be sufficient for a Godel complete system. As such, the openness of physics seems to be chance.
Comment by PvM — July 28, 2006 @ 5:01 pm
PvM–
Have you a link/citation for that?
[Update: Sorry, this was me, forgetting to logout after doing admin duties — Hannah]
Comment by Admin — July 28, 2006 @ 6:31 pm
@Admin,
http://www2.truman.edu/~edis/writings/articles/goedel.pdf
That’s the Taner Edis paper PvM was referring to.
Comment by Zohn Smith — July 28, 2006 @ 6:36 pm
Thanks Zane, that’s the paper. Taner Edis and Matt Young are also the (editors) authors of “Why intelligent design fails’. Well worth exploring as it involves such people as Korthof, Ussery, Musgrave, Hurd, Shallit and Elsberry, Shanks, Gishlick and others.
Comment by PvM — July 28, 2006 @ 6:42 pm
Allen,
I tried to tie in to something you said on your evolutionlist April 14, 2006 with a posting on the Specified Complexity website. I thought it might be of interest to you since it may tie into some of your other writings.
CSI: Measuring the Paradox of Purpose, Basic and Intermediate Concepts
I’d like to take a moment alos, by the way, to thank you again for the course, and your hard work. I would also like to salute your students for their work, and extend to them the best of luck.
regards,
Salvador
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova, IDEA GMU — July 29, 2006 @ 4:57 am
ID _matches_ a given product or system to what is the _expected_ product of mind.
Does it now? I do not see how this can be, given the constant reassurances that we know nothing of the identity, methods or motive of that mind. (Methods are important since the things that were allegedly designed were also allegedly implemented by said mind.) One would have to specifiy a specific mind of known properties to even make an attempt with this. Something like In His own image, which would completely blow the fiction that ID is not about religion.
Comment by ivy privy — July 29, 2006 @ 9:57 am
All Sal did in the posting was to 1) make many unsupported claims 2) show that ID at most can apply its approach to pure chance hypotheses, but fails to be scientifically relevant when it comes to analyzing scientific hypotheses.
Until Sal support some of his more outrageous claims, it seems safe to conclude that ID remains scientifically irrelevant, and vacuous.
Comment by PvM — July 29, 2006 @ 3:02 pm
Allen, I’d like to salute your students, too, at least the ones who aren’t so arrogant that they pretend to understand what the professionals can not.
And I also salute the United States Constitution. And The Rolling Stones. And whoever invented pizza.
Comment by Michael Hubl — July 29, 2006 @ 7:47 pm
ivy privy
Does it now? I do not see how this can be, given the constant reassurances that we know nothing of the identity, methods or motive of that mind.
Oops, ivy privy did it again!
Keep up this line of questioning, ivy, and you’ll find yourself banned. Maybe we should get back to arcane statistical mumbo jumbo so the ID promoters can play too.
Comment by Michael Hubl — July 29, 2006 @ 7:49 pm
This sounds like a veiled ad hominem against some of Allen’s students, and thus, since it’s directed apparently at the students in his class rather than the outsiders participating, I find it particularly distrubing.
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova, IDEA GMU — July 30, 2006 @ 6:52 am
Sal
I find it particularly distrubing.
You find it “disturbing” that I would dare to characterize as “arrogant” undergraduates who believe that they understand evolutionary biology better than professional evolutionary biologists?
If your threshold is that low, Sal, you must spend a lot of time being “disturbed” …
Comment by Michael Hubl — July 30, 2006 @ 2:31 pm
This isn’t PandasThumb, Michael. People posting here were asked to abide by certain standards in their comments, and your comments are out of line in this weblog.
Issues of people’s character are off limits here.
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova, IDEA GMU — July 30, 2006 @ 3:32 pm
Sal is confused about Pandasthumb, people are requireed to abide by certain standards, but unlike many pro-ID ‘discussion’ sides, critical comments are not removed at the discretion of the editors but rather they are addressed.
As far as Michael’s comments are concerned, do you think that there are undergraduates in the class who believe that they understand evolutionary biology better than professional evolutionary biologists? Or is that set, much like the set of ‘intelligent design’ perhaps an empty set?
Comment by PvM — July 30, 2006 @ 3:44 pm
Other rules of engagement here include clearly labelling opinion as such, and providing citations of statements declared to be factual when challenged.
Both of which Sal routinely ignores.
I’d be all for the rules being enforced evenly.
By my count, one post of Michael’s would be deleted along with some dozens of Sal’s …
Comment by Don Baccus — July 30, 2006 @ 3:53 pm
Michael– I understand you are annoyed at me and consider me the most arrogant undergrad you’ve ever met; but still, according to the rules of engagement, you’re supposed to keep your views on that score to yourself or else air them in another forum. If you’d like to participate here you’ll have to write more substantive commentary; for example, you might begin by explaining why I’m wrong.
Comment by Hannah — July 30, 2006 @ 6:38 pm
In comment #14 Michael Hubl wrote:
Having spent the last five weeks in rather intensive discussions with the students in our course, I believe I can say pretty confidently that none of them are in any way “arrogant” at all. On the contrary, all of the participants in our seminar have treated each other with respect and have listened carefully to what each person has to say. This does not mean that we have all agreed on the issues. However, we have all agreed from the very beginning that each of us is committed to a search for clarity on the very difficult issues that we have been examining, and that such clarity is most effectively found when people stick to the issues, rather than discussing each other’s characters (and without speculating about each other’s motivations). To do otherwise is to fundamentally misunderstand what a committment to academic integrity is all about.
Ergo, Michael, I suggest that you stick to the issues and make arguments supported by evidence and/or references, or go elsewhere. Virtually all of the other posters and commentators to this website have done so (with some encouragement and, shall we say, remonstration). We may not agree with each other’s positions, and we certainly do not necessarily agree on what constitutes convincing or valid evidence, but all of us agree that this is how intelligent, self-respecting people conduct themselves.
And, as a passionate supporter of the theory and practice of evolutionary biology, I once again find it distressing to have to say something this obvious to someone who is supposed to be on “my side.”
Comment by Allen MacNeill — July 30, 2006 @ 7:50 pm
And, to those others on the “evolution side”, do you honestly think that the people reading these posts and comments are so stupid or so lacking in sophistication to follow the arguments being presented here, and to discern which of the participants knows what they are talking about and who is “grasping at straws,” “moving the goalposts,” “changing the subject to avoid confronting disconfirming evidence,” and committing other egregious errors of logic and empirical verification? Some people make consistent, well-thought-out, well-supported arguments and some people do not. Are you that insecure about your own position that you think that this is not obvious to most of the people reading here? That is why we have the “rules of engagement” that we have, and why we insist that all participants stick to them. Resorting to ad hominem arguments is essentially an admission of failure in one’s attempt to mount logical, supportable arguments. Speculating about people’s motivations is even worse; if one is so blind as to not be able to infer motivations from one’s opponent’s inability to stick to the subject at hand, then one not only has no business participating in discussions such as these, one is also undermining the validity of the arguments being made by others in one’s own camp who do not “break the rules.”
Shape up or shut up.
Comment by Allen MacNeill — July 30, 2006 @ 8:03 pm
In comment #19, Salvador Cordova wrote:
Indeed; as a teacher of biology with over 35 years standing at Cornell, I would never allow a statement like Michael’s to stand unchallenged. No one in the class was identified as his target; therefore, every student in the class (which, BTW, does not include Hannah, who is an “invited participant”) could easily conclude that Michael was addressing them. My students have been working hard this summer, and they have held their own in disputes in both directions. I am proud of them, and ashamed to be associated with someone who would impugn either their efforts or their motivations, particularly without having any direct knowledge of either. To do so is demagoguery, pure and simple, and will not be tolerated here, either in the seminar course or on this website.
’nuff said. On to the subjects at hand…
Comment by Allen MacNeill — July 30, 2006 @ 8:20 pm
“So we are now moving away from the concept of specified complexity and ID looks at what are expected products of mind.”
How is this “away from specified complexity”? Specified complexity is an attempt to empirically measure complex specified information, which is the kind expected to be produced by intelligent designers (i.e. designs in patterns, according to blueprints — CSI is an attempt to deduce this in absence of the blueprint itself).
“Of course, ID presents no positive hypotheses as to what are expected products of the mind.”
It doesn’t? It seems that Wells is using ID to generate hypotheses about the functioning of centrioles. I’ve used ID to generate hypotheses about the functioning of N and P elements in V(D)J recombination.
“Calling it ‘holistically designed systems’ is not going to resolve this matter.”
Holistic design is what ID’ers expect. Messy combinations of parts is what would be expected by non-telic processes. Just look at the code generated by Avida.
“Perhaps you can explain to us what you mean by ‘if physics is open’?”
How is this hard to figure out?
“Taner Edis has written an excellent paper showing that regularity and chance can actually be sufficient for a Godel complete system. As such, the openness of physics seems to be chance.”
No, I read the paper. Edis completely misunderstood what is being claimed. The paper simply provides counterexamples the the statement listed on the first page, which is:
“Human Intelligence is not bound by rules. We are not locked into any formal system, always able to step outside of any set of axioms we happen to be working in”
This is a strawman, because it is not what anyone (Voie or otherwise) are claiming. It’s not just the ability to step “outside the axioms”, it is the ability to construct true statements about the system which are unprovable from first-order logic from the system’s axioms.
In fact, what I found most amusing about the whole thing, is that in order to generalize his statement, he relies on the “infinite monkeys theorem”. He doesn’t call it that, but if I’m reading it right Proposition 2 starting on page 8 is simply a mathematical description of the infinite monkeys theorem, and such he, like others who have used such arguments, fail to look at the _cost_ involved in searching such a space, or even the more basic question of whether or not the language you are using is even able to generate what you need.
The fact that randomness can be useful in algorithms is hardly surprising (in fact, QuickSort relies on this), but this in and of itself does not allow an algorithm to produce true statements about a system which do not follow as first-order logical products from axioms.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — July 31, 2006 @ 1:08 am
Hannah wrote:
From the Panda’s Thumb comment policy:
See for example Theory is as Theory does for an example of a (slightly math heavy) PT post with sensible discussion.
Comment by Ian Musgrave — July 31, 2006 @ 1:41 am
As a clarification:
In the context of the recent discussion in our seminar, “pre-existing design” (which we eventually decided could also be called “intrinsic design”) is a design for some object or process that exists in non-material form prior to the coming into existence of the object/process being designed. In this sense, any human design or plan for something that is eventually brought into existence is a form of “pre-existing design.” An example of such “pre-existing design” is Mozart’s score for his requiem mass, which he first composed in his mind, then later set down on paper, and eventually was performed by musicians. That is, Mozart’s “design” for the requiem “pre-existed” (in immaterial form) the actualization of the requiem. I personally have no problem with the existence of such “design” in the minds of humans (or even in the “minds” of some higher vertebrates), and do not see it as a contradiction to the principles of “evolutionary naturalism” at all. On the other hand, it is extremely problematic to see how such “pre-existing design” could possibly exist in nature, as there would be no physical substrate in which such a design could be formulated, nor any means by which it could be actualized.
In contrast with the foregoing is what we agreed to refer to as “emergent design,” which is a design or plan for some object or process that is encoded in the physical material of the “designing entity” and which is expressed in the interactions between that entity and its environment. This is essentially the same kind of “design” that Mayr referred to under the heading of “teleonomy” in his 1974 paper on the subject of teleology and teleonomy. As Ayala, Mayr, Nagel, and others (including myself) have pointed out, there is no contradiction between this kind of “design” and the basic principles of evolutionary biology and natural science. “Emergent design” is “emergent” in the same sense that all other physiological and behavioral adaptations are “emergent properties” of the organism, arising out of interactions between the organism (and ultimately its genome) and its environment. Furthermore, as Mayr and others have pointed out, such “emergent design” can be considered as residing at least partly in the environment itself, in what Mayr referred to as “open programs,” which can be modified during an organism’s lifetime as the result of intereactions between the organism and its environment.
Using this distinction between “pre-existing” and “emergent” design, it may even be possible to show that the two are at least somewhat interchangeable, if one can show that there are underlying natural properties (call them “laws of emergent complexity”, as in Stuart Kaufman’s work) that bias evolution in the direction of increasing complexity and inter-relationship between organisms and a “natural” tendency toward certain forms of adaptation. However, there is at present very little empirical evidence of such “organizing forces” in the basic laws of nature, and increasing evidence that the mechanisms of evolutionary development can produce the same kinds of effects without resort to “pre-existing” (i.e. immaterial) teleological “designs.”
Therefore, it seems to me that this is still very much an open question (and has certainly not been put to rest by either the EB or ID “camps”) whose resolution can only be found in further empirical research. As such, it seems to me that speculation about the existance of “pre-existing design” does not by itself provide any evidence for the existance of such design at all, regardless of how mathematically rigorous such speculation may be. The “gold standard” in all of the natural sciences (as opposed to, for example, pure mathematics) is empirical testing and verification, and as even most ID theorists will admit, such testing has not yet really begun, much less yielded unambiguous validation for such speculations.
As to the question of possible theological implications of either type of “design,” I believe that such questions are clearly beyond the scope of the empirical sciences (indeed, they cannot be empirically investigated at all), and therefore discussion of such is not appropriate under the rubric of “science.”
Comment by Allen MacNeill — July 31, 2006 @ 9:25 am
Resorting to ad hominem arguments is essentially an admission of failure in one’s attempt to mount logical, supportable arguments…
Shape up or shut up.
I do hope the standards will be applied fairly to both sides. I could, for example, point out an instance in which a question of mine was refered to as “it reminds me of the notoriously bad “kindergarten argument” from…” Which I consider to be a thinly veiled ad hominem. Suppose instead of just calling someone a moron, I said, “that’s the sort of argument a moron would make”; would that be considered an ad hominem attack or not? Somehow, the “kindergarten” comment slipped past the moderator. BTW, My original question, which was indeed “kindergarten”-simple, but not “bad”, was never answered.
It doesn’t? It seems that Wells is using ID to generate hypotheses about the functioning of centrioles.
Does it seem that way to you? I presume you are writng of RIVISTA DI BIOLOGIA / BIOLOGY FORUM 98 (2005), pp. 71 - 96. How do Wells’ hypotheses about the centriole follow directly from ID? How do they differ from hypotheses about the centriole that might be derived using mainstream biology? Does Wells proposal that the system is “holistically designed” have any merit? Does it have anything to do with the proposed functioning of the system?
Comment by ivy privy — July 31, 2006 @ 10:13 am
“How do Wells’ hypotheses about the centriole follow directly from ID?”
The general formula is like this — since ID’ers think that many (if not most) features of organisms are designed, we can use humanly-designed objects which perform similar functions as a means of helping to predict presently unknown functions and structures. In Well’s case, one of the things that he predicts he will find is an “archimedes screw” based on the low-turbulence of the fluids in the system. That is, you can reliably determine the type of engineering used based on the needs of the system. This is possible to do when you assume design, but there is little justification for thinking this way if non-telic forces predominated (just see the sort of solutions Avida came up with for even simple problems, and compare that to the well-suited solutions in cells for very difficult flow-related problems). ID allows us to say, “this might be designed — let’s use an assumption of design to infer things about the system not presently known”.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — July 31, 2006 @ 11:33 pm
William A. Dembski Organisms using GAs vs. Organisms being built by GAs thread at ISCID 18. September 2002
Sounds like much of a science killer to me. Why is intelligently design poorly positioned to explain much of anything? The answer is very simple: Since ID refuses to make explain much of anything about the designer, it cannot constrain the designer and cannot provide the necessary data to support any claims based on the non-existent design ‘hypothesis’. Since design is based on a purely eliminative approach, it is not much different from the ‘we don’t know’ hypothesis which also does not allow us to constrain the ‘designer’. For example, IDers like to claim that the Cambrian explosion or Junk DNA can be better explained by Intelligent Design. So let’s explore this claim, can it be shown that P(Intelligent Design|Junk DNA) > P(Natural processes|Junk DNA) ? The answer is a simple no:
That Intelligent Design is scientifically vacuous can be simply captured by showing that (thanks to Steve Verdon)
IDC : Intelligent Design
E: For instance junk DNA
P(IDC|E)=P(E|IDC)*P(IDC)/P(E)
Since Intelligent Design refuses/is unable to give plausible hypotheses that allow one to calculate the likelihood on the right hand side P(E|IDC) because it refuses to make assumptions about the designer, ID cannot really say anything about much of anything. Thus when IDers claim that Intelligent Design explains/predicts such issues as junk DNA or the Cambrian or even the flagellum, ask them to fill out the “simple formula” above.
Source: Debunkers.org
My argument is untill the IDCists are ready to start talking about the designer then the above problem will never be resolved.
Other IDers have made the claim that ID is the ‘best explanation’ but how can it be the best explanation when it cannot provide for a hypothesis that can compete with other hypotheses? If one wants to make the claim that ID either explains certain features or that ID is the best explanation then ID will have to confront the foundation of its troubles namely its inability to provide an estimate of P(E|IDC) where E is the data to be explained (Cambrian explosion, Junk DNA, even the bacterial flagella.
Is there a solution to this problem? Ryan Nichols decided to look in more detail at Intelligent Design
Source: Ryan Nichols, Scientific content, testability, and the vacuity of Intelligent Design theory The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2003 ,vol. 77 ,no 4 ,pp. 591 - 611
Comment by PvM — August 1, 2006 @ 1:14 am
That is, you can reliably determine the type of engineering used based on the needs of the system. This is possible to do when you assume design, but there is little justification for thinking this way if non-telic forces predominated
I’m afraid I don’t follow you here. Wouldn’t the standard scientific viewpoint of natural selection tell you that any solution which exists “fills the needs of the system”? Otherwise: 1) they would lose out to better-equipped competitors or 2) they might go extinct or 3) ecological niches might go unfilled because no candidate managed to get their needs filled.
Since extinctions are actually known to have happened, is this observation more consistent with natural selection, or with a designer who sets out to “fill the needs of the system”?
Following this line of reason requires that we chuck the requirement that we know nothing about the identity, methods or motives of the designer, i.e. it is an “argument from bad design”, but since you are OK with that, I am too.
Comment by ivy privy — August 1, 2006 @ 10:17 am
This is possible to do when you assume design, but there is little justification for thinking this way if non-telic forces predominated (just see the sort of solutions Avida came up with for even simple problems, and compare that to the well-suited solutions in cells for very difficult flow-related problems). ID allows us to say, “this might be designed — let’s use an assumption of design to infer things about the system not presently known”.
If you wanted to reduce this to “ID provides a source of inspiration for thinking up certain things”, then it is a much smaller claim, and one that is irrelevant to the content of the science. I don’t care if a researcher’s ideas come from dreaming about SNAKES ON A PLANE, the ideas must still be subjectable to scientific scrutiny. That would require that his ideas generate testable hypotheses. It might be possible to explore whether the centriole operates an an Archimes screw, but I do not see any tests of Wells’ ideas about the centriole that would distinguish whether it was a product of ID or a product of mechanisms of mainstream biology(i.e. natural selection and all the other mechanisms of evolution and biology in general)
Comment by ivy privy — August 1, 2006 @ 10:28 am
No, because “natural selection” is not magical — it needs a generative mechanism which is capable of getting there. ID allows one to posit holistically designed systems whether or not such a generative mechanism is available, while natural selection only would limit one that could be generated through chance and necessity.
Say “X is selectable” is not equivalent with saying “X could be _reached_ through selection”. This point is often confused in the literature. ID says that there are selectable traits which are unreachable via natural selection alone.
“Since extinctions are actually known to have happened, is this observation more consistent with natural selection, or with a designer who sets out to “fill the needs of the system”?”
Two things:
1) You are assuming a perfect designer. ID does not posit a perfect designer (note, however, that I think the designer is perfect, but it is not a requirement of ID itself).
2) You are assuming that the designs were individual species. ID does not posit that designs are individual species (in fact, neither do Creationists). The unit of design is very likely much smaller than that.
3) You are assuming that the lifespan is supposed to be infinite. Most designs we are familiar with have a lifespan.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — August 1, 2006 @ 11:28 am
Bartlett has shown that ID really could not have made the prediction about the flagella, unless he can explain to us what P(E|H) was where H is the design inference and E the evidence found.
While ID may have assisted in formulating a hypothesis which was found to be of high probability, it does not require ID and in fact finding a fully natural mechanism does little to support the ID hypothesis either. Given the constraints of the environment, it is not surprising that a working function is constrained and thus that we find a function which matches the environment’s constraints hardly seems surprising. Which is why eliminating natural processes and selection as a designer is non-trivial. In fact, I argue that Well’s presumptions did include natural selection as a designer.
Comment by PvM — August 1, 2006 @ 12:36 pm
No, because “natural selection” is not magical — it needs a generative mechanism which is capable of getting there. ID allows one to posit holistically designed systems whether or not such a generative mechanism is available, while natural selection only would limit one that could be generated through chance and necessity.
1) This is not positive evidence for ID, it is an argument from ignorance. The only tests it leads to are tests of the evolutionary explanation, not if ID. Those tests have, in many cases, been quite fruitful. Take for example, research into the evolutionary origins of the immune system.
2) Note that Mr. Bartlett acknowledges that ID invokes magic, while evolution does not.
Two things:
Really? Is it possible for me to point out this obvious error without making it an ad hominem? Probably not, as I am quite sarcastic.
1) You are assuming a perfect designer. ID does not posit a perfect designer (note, however, that I think the designer is perfect, but it is not a requirement of ID itself).
OK then, ID makes no assumptions, such as “the designer wants his designs to actually function; or that in fact he wants them to be optimal solutions”. It is only your particular version (and Wells’) of the designer that makes assumptions, and therefore makes predictions. You have gained nothing here. No assumptions, no predictions. If you make the argument from good design, I respond with the argument from bad design. You have opened the door. And evidence of bad design is abundant: Human back problems, rabbits having to pass food through their gut twice, the panda’s thumb, etc etc etc. I’m sure you’ve seen many examples listed before.
2) You are assuming that the designs were individual species. ID does not posit that designs are individual species (in fact, neither do Creationists). The unit of design is very likely much smaller than that.
I don’t believe I made that assumption. You will find that I specifically said, “Otherwise: 1) they would lose out to better-equipped competitors…”, which works just as well for individuals as for species.
3) You are assuming that the lifespan is supposed to be infinite. Most designs we are familiar with have a lifespan.
I have no idea to what you might be referring. Please very specifically point out where I made any assumption about the lifespan of the designer. Make sure its not a direct response to something you proposed.
Comment by ivy privy — August 1, 2006 @ 1:25 pm
Say “X is selectable” is not equivalent with saying “X could be _reached_ through selection”. This point is often confused in the literature. ID says that there are selectable traits which are unreachable via natural selection alone.
Thus my comment about the exisstence of non-optimal solutions and unfilled ecological niches. Thank you for underlining my point.
Comment by ivy privy — August 1, 2006 @ 1:32 pm
I entered a detailed response to #38, but it hasn’t shown up yet. I don’t know if its sitting in a queue or if its been censored. If it’s not up by wednesday morning I’ll try again.
Comment by ivy privy — August 1, 2006 @ 4:56 pm
Response to #36 in pieces:
No, because “natural selection” is not magical — it needs a generative mechanism which is capable of getting there. ID allows one to posit holistically designed systems whether or not such a generative mechanism is available, while natural selection only would limit one that could be generated through chance and necessity.
There it is. Mr. Bartlett acknowledges that ID is “magical”. Evolution (i.e. mainstream biology) is not. Evolution requires a “generative mechanism”. Modern biology has a plethora of such mechanisms: a variety of methods for generating variation, and several options for selection (natural selection, sexual selection, neutral drift). Evolution proposes antecedents and intermediates.
1) These are things that can be tested.
2) Such tests have been highly successful and productive over the last ~ 150 years.
3) ID meanwhile, has no positive evidence for its magical solutions. ID has a lack of poof.
Comment by ivy privy — August 2, 2006 @ 9:28 am
Say “X is selectable” is not equivalent with saying “X could be _reached_ through selection”. This point is often confused in the literature. ID says that there are selectable traits which are unreachable via natural selection alone.
To reiterate, indeed there are traits that would be selectable, but which have not been reached through natural selection. That is why we see solutions that are suboptimal, and why ecological niches may go unfilled.
Comment by ivy privy — August 2, 2006 @ 9:31 am
Two things:
Mr. Bartlett is wrong again!
Comment by ivy privy — August 2, 2006 @ 9:32 am
1) You are assuming a perfect designer. ID does not posit a perfect designer (note, however, that I think the designer is perfect, but it is not a requirement of ID itself).
It is Mr. Bartlett, and Dr. Wells who are making assumptions. Wells assumed that his Designer desired that his solutions would function, and indeed, function optimally. It is only by making assumptions that you get predictions. No assumptions, no predictions. Therefore, the standard ID position referred to makes no assumptions about the identity, methods or motive of the designer, and therefore makes no testable predictions. Mr. Bartlett also seems to be saying that any work making predictions, e.g. by himself or by Wells, is not ID.
You can’t play both sides of the deck, Mr. Bartlett. If you make the argument from good design, you open yourself up to the argument from bad design.
Comment by ivy privy — August 2, 2006 @ 9:36 am
2) You are assuming that the designs were individual species. ID does not posit that designs are individual species (in fact, neither do Creationists). The unit of design is very likely much smaller than that.
I said, (#34)”Otherwise: 1) they would lose out to better-equipped competitors or 2) they might go extinct” I believe those would apply equally well to individuals, except that “extinct” might be a poor word choice for that application. “fail to contribute ot future generations”, perhaps? The criticism is off-target.
Comment by ivy privy — August 2, 2006 @ 9:39 am
3) You are assuming that the lifespan is supposed to be infinite. Most designs we are familiar with have a lifespan.
In your first sentence, does ‘lifespan’ refer to the design, or the designer? At any rate, I was merely responding to your statements. If you wish to assume that either the design(er) has a finite lifespan or does not, then you can make predictions. Once again, No assumptions, no predictions.
Comment by ivy privy — August 2, 2006 @ 9:42 am
ivy —
I apologize for my delay in responding.
1) Lifespan refers to the design
2) On the topic of “extinction”, my point was that the unit of design matters when making distinctions of whether a design was better-equipped or not. The statement has little relevance except if you assume that species (or individuals) were the level of design, at least as far as I understood it.
3) As far as good design/bad design, while I would love to agree with you that my own and Wells arguments actually advocated Creationism instead of intelligent design, the fact is that “bad design” occurs just as much in patterns as “good design”. I’ve worked with both good and bad designers. They all use essentially the same toolbox. Some are inept at its use. While it is true that Wells and I both assume a competent designer, such would be the default assumption in _any_ sort of reverse-engineering activity. I’ve had to reverse-engineer code from designers who I neither knew them individually nor even their names. Yet the default assumption when investigating a designed system is that the designer had some idea what they are doing. This is a completely different mode than when tracking down a bug, even if it is a beneficial bug! Happenstance and design look completely different when you are chasing causes. When investigating non-designed occurrences, usually you investigate it according to temporal changes — what system changes occurred most recently, what other things have been occurring differently. When investigating designed occurrences, you look for design patterns, try to find the purpose, and have a default assumption of purpose for all unusual finds.
4) “To reiterate, indeed there are traits that would be selectable, but which have not been reached through natural selection. That is why we see solutions that are suboptimal, and why ecological niches may go unfilled.” This assumes that all ecological niches would be filled, and all possible combinations tried, in order for design to be valid. Design is valid because function/purpose is more important in examining and understanding biological systems than evolvability.
5) “Mr. Bartlett acknowledges that ID is “magical”.” It isn’t magical, any more than any other intelligent agent working is magical. (if you consider intelligent agency of the ordinary human type is “magical”, then, sure, ID is magical). The reason I referred to it as “magical” is because it was inanimate objects that would need to take on the form of intelligent agents to function as they are described.
6) “Such tests have been highly successful and productive over the last ~ 150 years.” I would disagree. They have been successful in pointing to the way that variation occurs, but they have not been successful in explaining the origins of intricate, holistic systems, for which it was claimed that it solved.
7) “ID meanwhile, has no positive evidence for its magical solutions. ID has a lack of poof.” DNA. Symbolic, self-referential codes. Complex, specified information. Holistic systems. The ability to determine functionality based on design principles. I’d say ID has a _lot_ of positive evidence. In fact, I’d say that at least some of what has been claimed as a victory for evolutionary biology in the past 150 years has been unintentionally using ID assumptions.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — August 3, 2006 @ 9:41 am
7) “ID meanwhile, has no positive evidence for its magical solutions. ID has a lack of poof.” DNA. Symbolic, self-referential codes. Complex, specified information. Holistic systems. The ability to determine functionality based on design principles. I’d say ID has a _lot_ of positive evidence. In fact, I’d say that at least some of what has been claimed as a victory for evolutionary biology in the past 150 years has been unintentionally using ID assumptions.
DNA: unsupported assertion. Please explain how you would go about finding evidence that DNA is in fact designed. Do it without falling into the “argument from ignorance” trap.
Symbolic, self-referential codes: I have no idea what you are talking about.
CSI: much discussed elsewhere. No actual results anywhere.
Holistic systems: This appears to me to be a substitute phrase for “irreducible complexity” which has faired very poorly in the labs and in the courts, and which is an argument from ignorance.
The ability to determine functionality based on design principles: I’m not sure what this is about. The laws of nature and mechanical principles would apply to a system no matter whether it arose through design or evolution.
You might say there’s a lot of positive evidence, but you can’t actually produce any. This seems to be more a rhetorical flourish than a statement of substance. If you have some “positive evidence” you think is convincing and rigorous, by all means publish it in the peer-review literature.
Comment by ivy privy — August 3, 2006 @ 1:41 pm
“If you have some “positive evidence” you think is convincing and rigorous, by all means publish it in the peer-review literature.”
The argument I was using (DNA being symbolic and self-referential) already is in the peer-review literature. Also see this paper, which, while it doesn’t conclude ID, it does conclude that it has a cause which is neither chance nor necessity, and that science needs to develop new methods and paradigms in order to investigate the situation (hmmm… isn’t that what ID is doing?)
“This appears to me to be a substitute phrase for “irreducible complexity” which has faired very poorly in the labs and in the courts, and which is an argument from ignorance.”
Yes. Irreducible complexity is an attempted empirical definition of holism. Please name the lab experiment which shows Behe’s examples to be false. And no, it is not an argument from ignorance, at least any more than _any_ scientific argument for _anything_ is an argument from ignorance (you could always appeal to unknown forces supporting your argument, no matter what the question is — saying that ID is wrong because it doesn’t take into account forces which are unknown is quite silly). But IC is based not only on a negative, but also on a positive — it is similar to how a designer would act. You can’t take any arbitrary X for which we do not know its origin and claim it is IC. It has to also have well-matched parts and accomplish a purpose, both of which are attributes of design.
“The ability to determine functionality based on design principles: I’m not sure what this is about.”
What we’ve been talking about with Well’s centriole hypothesis.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — August 3, 2006 @ 5:04 pm
The argument I was using (DNA being symbolic and self-referential) already is in the peer-review literature. Also see this paper, which
Since MacNeiil’s students are all so durned bright, I’ll leave it to them to assess the quality of those papers.
and that science needs to develop new methods and paradigms in order to investigate the situation (hmmm… isn’t that what ID is doing?)
I don’t think so. At risk of violating the rules of engagement, ID seems to me to be writing non-peer-review books and lobbying school boards. As reported in the NYTimes, December 4, 2005, by Laurie Goodsetein, Intelligent Design Might Be Meeting Its Maker:
Comment by ivy privy — August 3, 2006 @ 7:30 pm
But IC is based not only on a negative, but also on a positive — it is similar to how a designer would act.
I fail to see how this argument is anything more than a rhetorical twist. Repetition does not improve the situation. You have no positive evidence of the workings of any “Intelligent Designer”. You have a “Lack of Poof”. You need to predict something positive with ID that is not predicted by mainstream biology, then carry out an experiment to verify the prediction. Since repetition is boring, I will stop repeating this for now.
Comment by ivy privy — August 3, 2006 @ 7:36 pm
“Repetition does not improve the situation.”
Nor does argument from personal incredulity. The fact is that there is more than a negative argument there. It matches the observation (intricate interactions of many well-matched parts to perform a function, which have a necessary core to continue to function) to what we know produces such observations (designers). If you know of systems like this which are developed entirely through non-telic means, let me know. Just turning on your computer will give you examples of such systems which are designed.
Comment by Jonathan Bartlett — August 4, 2006 @ 12:09 am
How do you argue with people whose first principle seems to be “whatever intelligence can do, chance can do better”?
Comment by Brian K — August 4, 2006 @ 10:56 am
News Flash! Paul Nelson of the Discovery Institute lets it slip that they have a top secret scientific research program:
Now, Discovery actually funds a great deal of primary research — go ahead, snicker — but those receiving the support and their specific projects have become a very quiet business indeed, and that need for secrecy may continue for a long time. So I’m not griping about DI’s failure to support scientific research. I know what’s happening safely away from the relentless gaze of the Panda’s Thumb.
Comment by ivy privy — August 4, 2006 @ 3:54 pm
How do you argue with people whose first principle seems to be “whatever intelligence can do, chance can do better”?
1) You could use a counter-argument that wasn’t vacuous. If you had one.
2) You could stop making false and misleading arguments, such as attempting to portray evolution as purely random, i.e. “chance”. That sort of thing will hurt your credibility.
3) You could form a hypothesis (a testable prediction) involving this intelligence: what test could you run whose result would support the existence and involvement of this intelligence that wouldn’t be there otherwise?
a) Note that this would have to be a positive result, not a lack of something (i.e. a negative argument) that might be missing for other reasons (e.g. experimental difficulty, sparsity of the fossil record, etc).
b) This would have to be a prediction of something new. Explaining how something that everybody already knows about, such as the information content of DNA, is useless. You need to show that your theory has predictive power. Otherwise it is no more useful than a just-so story.
c) Note that the result should actually differ from what the alternative explanation (evolution) would produce.
d) For extra points, you could actually run the experiment you proposed.
This would be more productive and convincing than yet more rhetorical redundancy explaining how negative is positive, and begging for the standards of science to be lowered because you can’t meet them.
Comment by ivy privy — August 4, 2006 @ 4:10 pm
Bartlett: Nor does argument from personal incredulity.
What a very strange comment from someone who has touted ‘irreducible complexity’ in the guise of ‘holistic systems’.
Comment by ivy privy — August 5, 2006 @ 8:23 pm