First, many thanks to the faithful readers who have continued to pay attention to this site and the contents therein. I am particularly pleased that the hard work and careful thought of the students whose papers have been posted has been recognized, and even moreso that they have been given the highest praise possible: that is, critical analysis.

I would like to drawn some more attention to E. Broaddus paper on the “innate” tendency to infer purpose in nature. I have long suspected that humans (and perhaps many vertebrates, especially mammals) have this tendency. As an evolutionary psychologist, I at least partially subscribe to the idea that the human mind is composed primarily of “modules” whose functions are to process particular kinds of sensory information in such a way as to yield adaptive responses to complex environmental information. This is precisely what Broaddus argues for in her paper: that the human mind (and, by extension, the vertebrate “mind” in general) has a module that is adapted specifically for the precise and rapid inference of intentionality in nature. That such an “agency detector” (to use the commonly accepted term for such a module) would have immense adaptive value is obvious. In an environment in which other entities do indeed have “intentions” (i.e. predators, competitors, potential mates, etc.), the ability to detect and infer the possible consequences of acting upon such intentions would confer immense adaptive value on any organism with such an ability.

Furthermore, as Broaddus points out (and as we discussed briefly in the seminar), to be most effective such a detector should be tuned in such a way as to detect virtually all such “intention-indicating” behaviors. This would have the effect of producing a significant number of “false positives,” as any detector that is tuned high enough to detect all actual cases would have such a side-effect.

As Broaddus points out, one of the side-effects of such an “agency detector” would be the detection of intentionality in entities that clearly had no such intentions. If, for example, one of the most important functions of such a detector in humans is to quickly “read” and assess the intentions betrayed in human facial expressions, then it would almost certainly detect human facial expressions in objects in the environment that clearly do not have such expressions, such as rocks, foliage, water stains, etc. This would explain the ability of many humans to “see” human facial expressions in such things as water stains, cinnamon buns, rocks, etc.

Clearly, there are some “natural objects” that do, indeed, have human facial expressions impressed upon them: the faces of the presidents at Mount Rushmore are an example cited ad nauseam by ID theorists. However, I am much more interested in “faces” that humans detect in rocks and other environmental objects that are clearly not produced by human agency. Indeed, the faces at Mount Rushmore constitute a kind of “control” for this ability, as they are clearly the result of intentionality, and therefore can be used to anchor that end of the “agency detection” spectrum (at the other end of which are things like “faces” in clouds, tree foliage, etc.). Somewhere in this spectrum is a cross-over point at which actual intentionality/agency disappears and facticious intentionality/agency takes over. It is the location of that cross-over point that constitutes the hinge of the argument between evolutionary biologists and ID theorists.

Broaddus’s analysis of autism as a possible example of malfunctioning “agency detection” is, IMO, brilliant, and presents an immediately testable hypothesis: that autistic children lack well-tuned “agency detectors,” and that this at least partially explains their well-known indifference to intentional agents, such as other people (including their parents), animals, etc. In people with both full-blown autism and the milder Asperger’s syndrome (sometimes called Aspies”), a common attribute is an impaired ability to infer intentionality (or, in many cases, the mere existence of other minds) on the part of autistics and Aspies. As Broaddus points out, there are clear anatomical and functional differences between autistics, Aspies, and non-impaired people, and that these differences may be correlated with the etiology of these conditions. For example, it is very interesting that there appears to be more (rather than less) neurons in the brains of autistics than in non-impaired people. This lends credence to the generally accepted hypothesis that the information processing “modules” proposed by evolutionary psychologists are the result of “pared down” neural networks that are speciallized for particular cognitive tasks. Clearly, the agency/intentionality detector in humans functions extremely well and, as the parlance goes, “in the background.” We are rarely conscious of its operation, despite the fact that it is virtually always “on.” This explains, for example, something I first noticed as a young child: that no matter how much I tried, I couldn’t NOT see faces in the patterns in the linoleum on the floor of my grandmother’s kitchen, in the foliage of trees, in rocks, and in photographs of billowing smoke, splashing water, etc. The agency/intentionality detector works extremely efficiently in people of all ages, but especially in children. Indeed, as Broaddus points out, part of becoming an adult consists in learning (usually by trial-and-error) which of the seemingly intentional entities which we perceive all the time actually are intentional agents and actually have intentions vis-a vis ourselves. We must learn, in other words, to critically analyze the constant stream of “positive” agency/intentionality detection events, and discriminate between those that affect us and those that do not. It may be that this discrimination process actually involves the neurological “re-wiring” of the parts of the sensory/nervous system that produces such detection events, and this might explain, at least in part, the decreased ability of adults to believe in the existence of intentional agents in the natural environment.

Broaddus not only presents a cogent hypothesis concerning the existence of such an agency/intentionality detector/module in humans, she proposes several possible ways of testing whether or not such a detector actually exists, and to “map” its dimensions, capabilities, biases, and limitations. I believe that this opens up a very fruitful area of empirical research into such detectors, and can ultimately lead to much more clarity about an issue that so far has generated much more heat than light. I hope that her ideas and suggestions will be followed up by others (I certainly intend to do so), and that further empirical research into this fascinating and little-known capability will add to our understanding of what makes us the peculiar creatures we are.

Greetings, faithful readers! As promised, selected final research papers from the students enrolled in the “Evolution and Design” seminar at Cornell have now been uploaded to their own area in the Evolution and Design website. Just click on the “Student Papers” link in the menu bar on the right to find links for downloading them.

I was immensely impressed by the final research papers that the students submitted for this course, as well as by the level of participation in discussion and debate that took place during our seminar classes. All of the participants in the seminar worked hard this summer, but as you can see by the quality of the final papers, the enrolled students worked hardest of all. Each of the papers represents a diligent effort on the part of the author to come to clarity on some aspect of the “evolution-design controversy.” All of the authors argue for a specific position vis-a-vis the controversy, and as you can tell by reading them, they come down on both sides of the issue.

Personally, I was most impressed with E. Broaddus’s paper on the apparently innate tendency for humans to infer design in nature. This is a topic that I have long wanted to investigate, and Brauddus’s paper provides an extremely comprehensive and well-thought-out entrance to this topic, one that I believe is central to the entire controversy.

J. Bruno’s paper on mimicry and camoulflage provides a “design-friendly” perspective on a perennial topic in evolutionary biology, and provides a “synthetic” perspective that tries to reconcile the two viewpoints.

G. Huang’s paper on empirical evidence for natural selection in the wild addresses a crucial topic in evolutionary biology: how we can objectively determine whether natural selection has actually affected the evolution of a particular species? His analyses of natural selection in Galapagos finches and Labrabor blue/snow geese points out that natural selection, while central to the neo-darwinian theory of evolution, is difficult to measure in natural populations, requiring many years of careful demographic analysis and challenging field work.

E. Mathisen’s paper comparing philosophical and religious approaches to the problem of “origins” shows that the American tendency to separate into “pro-evolution” and “pro-design” camps doesn’t map very well onto other cultures, particularly those of India and China. Questions of origins and evolution are interpreted differently in different cultures, and as Mathisen shows, these concepts are not viewed with the same importance nor with the same presuppositions that generally pertain in America and western Europe.

J. Schaub’s paper on the implications of darwinian evolution for altruism and religion is a commentary on the current state of understanding in those fields. Schaub analyzes the work of Pascal Boyer and Scott Atran among others, showing how their evolutionary and anthropological theories of the origins of religion are intimately tied to the evolution of altruism, a subject of much debate and research during the second half of the 20th century.

Finally, J. Schlachet’s paper on a buddhist outlook on the evolution-design controversy, like E. Mathisen’s, shows that when viewed through a non-western perspective this controversy looks very different. Unlike the western Abrahamic religions (i.e. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism, and their derivatives), buddhism is much more easily reconciled with the basic principles of evolution by natural selection. Schlachet shows how a buddhist perspective can possibly provide a way of reconciling what appear to be two radically non-congruent paradigms of nature and purpose, and suggests ways in which this reconciliation might be accomplished.

All in all, a fascinating set of perspectives on what has always been (and will almost certainly continue to be) one of the core issues of evolutionary biology, if not all of natural science: the relationship between purpose and natural cause, and how we can distinguish between them. I’m sure that this is only the beginning of a much longer conversation (if not debate) over these issues, and I hope that all of the visitors to this website will continue to contribute their insights into this most fascinating of intellectual puzzles.

The notorious “evolution and design seminar at Cornell” has now ended. The final research papers have been submitted, final grades have been posted to the registrar, and the participants have departed for the four corners of the world…for now.

Having reached this stopping point, I want to say once again how much I enjoyed our time together this summer. When we went around the room last night and “summed up” what we had learned, three things seemed to have occurred to each of us:

* we learned how to construct and use logical arguments, supported by evidence;

* we learned how to respect each other and argue forcefully, without attacking each other as persons; and

* we came to clarity on what we thought about the issues presented in the course.

Everyone deserves praise for accomplishing this, and for persevering in what has been a sometimes complicated and difficult endeavor.

One person in particular deserves special mention: that is, of course, Hannah Maxson, without whom I suspect we might not have achieved anything like what we eventually did. She helped us all immensely in understanding and wrestling with these issues, faithfully attended every class session despite not being an enrolled student (the only “invited participant” from either side to do so), consistently presented an example of how to respectfully but forcefully argue for one’s positions, and spent uncounted hours setting up and moderating the two websites associated with this course, while at the same time holding down a demanding day job. For all of us, I humbly say “thank you, Hannah.”

And to the rest of you (enrolled students): my hat is off to you as well! I have taught many courses at Cornell (and elsewhere), and learned a lot from my students, but you were without a doubt the best yet. Your papers were outstanding (some actually had me gasping in surprise and admiration), and will be posted to the website soon. Thank you for being who you were, and for making this summer one of the most enjoyable I can remember. Have a great August, and good luck in whatever you do this coming year. And if you’re online or near G-24 Stimson Hall (the Biology Learning Skills Center) at Cornell, stop by the website or my office for a chat. And if you have a free hour this fall on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 10:10 to 11:00, stop by Call Auditorium in Kennedy Hall, where I will once again be assisting in Will Provine’s evolution course. We’ve still got a lot to talk about!

Which brings us to the rest of the story. This “conversation” is most emphatically not over yet, not by a long shot. I will be posting many of the final research papers submitted for the course to this website, for your enlightenment and delectation. Everyone worked hard at these, and all of them were interesting. A few were flat-out brilliant, as you will see for yourselves when you read them. I consider this website to be a place where “peer-reviewed” publications are presented to the wider public, because the research papers presented here by the students enrolled in the course have literally been reviewed by their peers - by all of us who sat together all those long, balmy nights in the Whittaker Room, dissecting each other’s arguments and challenging each other’s evidence. If possible, I would like this website to continue to serve that purpose; to be a place where people with perspectives from all sides of this debate can publish their ideas and get feedback from their peers. As we learned in our course this summer, this is how we can come to clarity on complex and difficult issues.

So, for all of you reading this, please stop back here, as often as you like. We will keep the doors open and welcome conversation and debate on these issues for as long as you continue to participate. And when you do, keep in mind the “rules of engagement” that made our summer together so productive and rewarding:

• Attacks of any kind against a person are never allowed, and anyone making them will be cast forever into outer darkness; however…

• Reasoned attacks against a person’s arguments, backed up by evidence, are required, and anyone participating here should be ready to defend their positions with all of the logic and evidence at their disposal; and

• Each of us should be our own most implacible critic; clarity comes not from mindless agreement nor disagreement, but from an open, honest, and unprejudiced exchange of views, backed up by evidence.

Following these rules (plus the more detailed list found under the “Rules of Engagement” link on the front page of this website) is everyone’s responsibility. That is how we built our little “community of scholars” this summer, and how we will continue to build it here.

So, thank you for all of your dedication and hard work, and let the conversation continue!

In comment # 20 at http://specifiedcomplexity.freehostia.com/?p=232 PvM said:

“ID relies on the concept of analogy to infer design. Science does the hard work to provide mechanisms, pathways and provides analyses of the data to support their conclusions. That’s the big difference. How do we know an analogy really exists?”

This was precisely my point in my blogpost on identity and analogy in science (see http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2006/06/identity-analogy-and-logical-argument.html), and brings up a series of questions that are central to both evolutionary biology and intelligent design theory. Do we have any objective way to determine if one rock is analogous with another, for example? Or whether an anatomical feature (or a protein/substrate binding site) is analogous to another? As in the case of telology, we think we can do this very easily (just as we can easily identify what looks like design), but I would argue that this is because both “finding” analogies and “finding” design/purpose are capabilities of the human mind/nervous system that have conferred enormous adaptive value on our ancestors. As in the case of our putative innate “agency/design/purpose detector” (which first becomes active in very early infancy), our “analogy detector” also appears to become active at a very early age, and operates entirely “in the background.” That is to say, we are almost totally unaware of its operation, and concentrate only on its output.

Our ability to detect (and construct) analogies is probably the core of our “intelligence,” as demonstrated by the fact that identifying analogies has been traditionally used as one of the most sensitive guages of general intelligence (i.e. “g”) in intelligence tests (such as the Miller Analogies Test). As more than one participant in this thread has pointed out (Sal, I think you were first), doing mathematics is essentially the construction of highly compact analogies, in which numerical (and sometimes physical) relationships are expressed as abstract symbols.

Interestingly, in the case of some analogies in biological systems we have an independent double-check on our identification of analogous things. This is based on the evolutionary concept of homology, or derivation from a common ancestor. If two structures on two different organisms (say a small bone of the jaw of a reptile and the even smaller bone in the middle ear of a mammal) appear to be analogous (on the basis of size, location, relationship to other bones, etc.) there are at least two different, though related, methods of verifying that these structures are indeed analogous (and not just accidentally similar). One way is by means of comparative paleoanatomy, in which a series of fossils of known age are compared to determine if there is a connection between the evolutionary pathways of derivation of the structures. If such a pathway can be empirically shown to exist, this would be strong evidence for both the analogous and homologous nature of the objects. Alternatively one could compare the nucleotide sequences that code for the structures to determine if they are sufficiently similar to warrant a conclusion of homologous derivation. In both cases, evidence for homology, combined with our intuitive “identification” of analogous structure and/or function, both point to the same conclusion: that the two structures are both analogous and homologous.

BTW, this is why structures that appear to be analogous, but for which there is no convincing evidence of homology (as in the wings of birds and insects) can present a serious problem to evolutionary biologists, and especially systematists/taxonomists and those engaged in cladistic analysis. Such apparent similarities (technically called homoplasies) can either be the result of “true” (i.e. partial) analogy at the functional (and/or structural) level (and therefore assumed to be the result of convergent evolution) or they can be completely accidental. Simple inspection can be insufficient to separate these two hypotheses, and lacking either fossil or genomic evidence, conclusions about actual analogy can be extremely difficult to draw. However, if there is fossil and/or genomic evidence and it points away from homology (i.e. descent from a common ancestor), then the structures can be considered to be analogous but not homologous.

In the same comment, PvM also wrote:

“I also think that Sal is overusing the concept of analogy to mean almost anything.”

Indeed, it is essential in discussions such as these that we be as precise as possible about our definitions, as imprecision can only lead to confusion (at best) and unsupportable conclusions (at worst). Perhaps the most essential distinction to be made in this regard is between “anaologies of description” (which could also be called “semantic analogies”) and “analogies of function/structure” (which could also be called “natural analogies”). The former (i.e. “semantic analogies”) are merely artifacts of the structure of human cognition and language, as happens whenever we describe an analogy that we have perceived. By contrast, the latter (i.e. “natural analogies”) are the actual similarities in function/structure that we are describing (i.e. that resulted in our identification and description in the first place). As in the Zen koan about the roshi and the novice in the moonlit garden, much of the confusion about which of the two types of analogies we are discussing seems to stem from confusion between the moon that illuminates the garden and the finger pointing at the moon.

Things have been developing in rather interesting ways in our “Evolution and Design” seminar. We have worked our way through all of the articles/papers and books in our required reading list, along with several in the recommended list. Before I summarize our “findings”, let me point out that for most of the summer our seminar has consisted almost entirely of registered students (all but one undergrads, with one employee taking the course for credit), plus invited guests (Hannah Maxson and Rabia of the Cornell IDEA Club). Two other faculty members (Warren Alman and Will Provine) attended for a while, but stopped in the middle of the second week, leaving me as the only faculty member still attending (not all that surprising, as it is my course after all - however, at this point I view my job mostly as facilitator, rather than teacher).

Anyway, here is how we’ve evaluated the books and articles/papers we’ve been “deconstructing”:

Dawkins/The Blind Watchmaker: The “Weasel” example is unconvincing, and parts of the book are somewhat polemical, by which we mean substituting assertion, arguments by analogy, arguments from authority, and various other forms of non-logical argument for legitimate logical argument (i.e. based on presentation and evaluation of evidence, especially empirical evidence). Dawkins’ argument for non-telological adaptation (the “as if designed” argument), although intriguing, seems mostly to be supported by assertion and abstract models, rather than by empirical evidence.

Behe/Darwin’s Black Box: The argument for “irreducible complexity”, while interesting, appears to leave almost all of evolutionary biology untouched. Behe’s argument is essentially focused on the origin of life from abiotic materials, and arguments for the “irreducible complexity” of the genetic code and a small number of biochemical pathways and processes. Therefore, generalizing his conclusions to all of evolutionary biology (and particularly to descent with modification from common ancestors, which he clearly agrees is “strongly supported by the evidence”) is not logically warranted. Attempts to make such extensions are therefore merely polemics, rather than arguments supported by evidence.

Dembski/The Design Inference and “Specification: The Pattern that Signifies Intelligence”: Dembski’s mathematical models are intriguing, especially his recent updating of the mathematical derivation of chi, his measure for “design” in complex, specified systems. However, it is not clear if empirical evidence (i.e. counted or measured quantities) can actually be plugged into the equation to yield an unambiguous value for chi, nor is it clear what value for chi would unambiguously allow for “design detection.” Dembski suggests chi equal to or greater than one, but we agreed that it would make more sense to use repeated tests, using actual designed and undesigned systems, to derive an empirically based value for chi, which could then be used to identify candidates for “design” in nature. If, as some have suggested, plugging empirically derived measurements into Dembski’s formula for chi is problematic, then his equation, however interesting, carries no real epistemic weight (i.e. no more than Dawkin’s “Weasel”, as noted above).

Johnson/The Wedge of Truth: To my surprise, both the ID supporters and critics in the class almost immediately agreed that Johnson’s book was simply a polemic, with no real intellectual (and certainly no scientific) merit. His resort to ad hominem arguments, guilt by association, and the drawing of spurious connections via arguments by analogy were universally agreed to be “outside the bounds of this course” (and to exceed in some cases Dawkins’ use of similar tactics), and we simply dropped any further consideration of it as unproductive. Indeed, one ID supporter stated quite clearly that “this book isn’t ID”, and that the kinds of assertions and polemics that Johnson makes could damage the credibility of ID as a scientific enterprise in the long run.

Ruse/Darwin and Design (plus papers on teleology in biology by Ayala, Mayr, and Nagel): Both ID supporters and evolution supporters quickly agreed that all of these authors make a convincing case for the legitimacy of inferring teleology (or what Mayr and others call “teleonomy”) in evolutionary adaptations. That is, adaptations can legitimately be said to have “functions,” and that the genomes of organisms constitute “designs” for their actualization, which is accomplished via organisms’ developmental biology interacting with their environments.

Moreover, we were able to come to some agreement that there are essentially two different types of “design”:

• Pre-existing design, in which the design for an object/process is formulated prior to the actualization of that object/process (as exemplified by Mozart’s composing of his final requiem mass); note that this corresponds to a certain extent with what ID supporters are now calling “front-loaded design”, and

• Emergent design, in which the design for an object/process arises out of a natural process similar to that by which the actualization takes place (as exemplified by Mayr’s “teleonomy”).

In addition, the ID supporters in the seminar class agreed that “emergent design” is not the kind of design they believe ID is about, as it is clearly a product of natural selection. A discussion of “pre-existing design” then ensued, going long past our scheduled closing time without resolution. We will return to a discussion of it for our last two meetings next week.

As we did not use the two days scheduled for “deconstruction” of Johnson’s Wedge of Truth, we opened the floor to members of the class to present rough drafts/outlines of their research papers for the course. It is interesting to note that both papers so presented concerned non-Western/non-Christian concepts of “design” (one focusing on Hindu/Indian and Chinese concepts of teleology in nature, and the other on Buddhist concepts of design and naturalistic causation).

Overall, the discussion taking place in our seminar classes has been both respectful and very spirited, as we tussle with difficult ideas and arguments. For my part, I have come to a much more nuanced perception of both sides of this issue, and to a much greater appreciation of the difficulties involved with coming to conclusions on what is clearly one of the core issues in all of philosophy. And, I believe we have all come to appreciate each other and our commitments to fair and logical argument, despite our differences…and even to have become friends in the process. What more could one ask for in a summer session seminar?

P.S. An open invitation to the other members of the class: if any of the statements strikes you as unrepresentative of what has been happening, please post a comment to that effect here…and thank you for keeping me honest!

… in the definition of Phi_S(T), the function Phi’(.) is applied both to T, which is a member of Omega, and to U, which is a member of Patterns(Omega). Even if patterns Omega is a well-defined set - which is far from certain - Phi’(.)…

Our server here is rather limited, and though I’ve been working on possible ways to make it a bit easier to write extensive math posts here, I haven’t met with much success. Many of you have been writing long and involved posts; but they symbols make them almost impossible to read, and the long threads, incorporating broad topics, make it difficult to follow a train of reasoning. So we’ve decided to expand, and hold our discussions of specified complexity at a new website with a bit more functionality.

This is not seperate from Evolution and Design, and the feeds for both comments and posts will be in the sidebar here (look under links). But this should help in two ways: 1)enabling clearer writing through the use of LaTeX and 2) encouraging more focused threads, by virtue of freer posting policies.

So– please visit the website and register. The way it will work: If you’ve contributed with more than seven substantive posts on the two threads discussing specified complexity here, and don’t have any strikes against you in that time period, you will automatically (i.e., as soon as we notice you’ve registered) be promoted to a writer, with the ability to make front-page posts. Class members also have posting priviliges, and everyone is welcome to comment. Feel free to repost recent comments from this thread if you feel it’ll help in the transition.

The ground rules do still apply, and if anything will be more strictly enforced there– but you can’t go far wrong when you’re talking about math, or?

You can write in LaTeX, or at least a minimalistic version thereof, by surrounding your equations with [tex] and [/tex]– an example would be tex] x^2 + y^2[/tex]. This should work both in the comments fields or if you’re writing a post. It doesn’t come out as beautifully as would be nice, but… significantly better than chi=-log_2[ M*N*phi(s)(T)* P(T|H)].

A syntax reference for the particular cgi we’re using is here, which tells you what you can and cannot do. You can play with fontsizes, but there isn’t much else besides math you can write.

We don’t have comment preview, but, instead, you’re allowed to edit your comment directly after you’ve posted it. There will be an “edit this” link next to your new comment for the first five minutes after it has been submitted, to give you a chance to fix syntax.

I know the course is almost over and I don’t know how many people will want to argue afterwards, but I figured it might be useful even for just a week– and, besides, I wanted the practice setting something like that up. :). It is probably rather buggy– mostly done over the past few nights, when I ought to have been asleep — but improvements will be made this weekend. So please email me with any and every complaint, as well as suggestions for making it work better.

Besides, where better to discuss specified complexity than in a thread title “Specified Complexity”?

On a website called “Specified Complexity”, maybe?

Since this blog calls itself “informal”, I’ll be informal: the gear is stowed, the food is on ice in the cooler, the canoe is on the roofrack, and the Goonies are rarin’ to go, so we’re headed for the Adirondacks for the weekend. However, this blog (and attendant moderation duties) are in Hannah’s very capable hands, so have a great weekend and I’ll be back to posting on Monday. Next week we’ll be diving into Phillip Johnson’s The Wedge of Truth (and I will, of course, bring up the “wedge document”), so it should be an exciting and interesting week.

BTW, we have received a number of comments asking/begging/demanding that we moderators do something to censor certain commentators because they believe that they are not responding to counter-arguments and/or failing to provide references or other support (including logical arguments) for what they believe to be assertions. Well, folks, we can’t force people to identify their unsupported assertions as opinions, we can only ask them to do so. If you think that this is what is happening, then you need to provide counter-arguments (notice I didn’t say counter-assertions) that are supported by relevent citations. That way we can all identify who is really making supported arguments and who is simply arguing via assertion (or trying to change the subject). And we can do so politely, but firmly, right? Right. Good, now play nice until I get back…

I am getting ready to take my family to a Scottish highland games in central Massachusetts (my two oldest are competing in highland dance), so this will have to be brief. Last night we finished our discussion of Michael Behe’s book, Darwin’s Black Box (DBB). The discussion ran over the end of the class period (it has been doing that pretty consistently), and it seemed that there were a number of points still under dispute, both between the EBers and IDers in the class, and within each group (i.e. we must be going something right, eh?)

Consequently, the following points are basically my own, and do not necessarily represent the concensus of the class.

(1) Behe defines “design” on pg. 194 and provides an algorithm of sorts for its detection:

“…design is evident when a number of separate, interacting components are ordered in such a way as to accomplish a function beyond the original components.

However, as I pointed out, according to this definition a thunderstorm cell (i.e. cumulonimbus cloud) would qualify as designed. We generally agreed that thunderclouds are not designed, but are rather the result of a combination of relatively simple physical (i.e. natural) properties and processes. Ergo, Behe’s definition of design is rejected, as it has a tendency to detect false positives. Furthermore, merely revising it is problematic, as this would tend to bias it toward false negatives.

(2) All of the examples of design Behe provides in pages 194-204 to support his definition and design detection algorithm are clearly and unambiguously designed because they are all designed by humans, and we all agree that humans can indeed design things. However, arguing that this somehow validates his defintion/algorithm is simply an argument by analogy, and we have already concluded that this form of argument alone is logically specious.

(3) In pages 203-205, Behe argues that all of this examples of irreducible complexity (and therefore design - eukaryotic cilia, prokaryotic flagella, mammalian blood clotting, intracellular transport, mammalian immunity, AMP regulation, and biochemical pathways in general) all have functions. But, as Ayala, Mayr, Nagel, Bedau, and others on the EB side have cogently argued, functions per se are fully compatible with evolution by natural selection. In a nutshell, genetic programs are “designers,” but there is no empirical evidence that they are themselves the result of design.

(4) In pages 206-207, Behe argues that not all biochemical systems are designed nor irreducibly complex (and using the phospholipid bilayer “unit membrane” and hemoglobin s examples). This immediately leads to a question Behe does not address: why are only some biochemical systems designed? Therefore, the “Intelligent Designer’s” motives must be an irreducible component of any comprehensive explanation of designed irreducible comlexity (DIC).

(5) From the examples cited through page 230, it is clear that DIC theory is only offered as an explanation for the origin of life from non-living materials, the origin of the genetic code, and the origin of the biochemical systems listed in #3 (above). Therefore, the whole of evolutionary theory as presented by Darwin, plus the overwhelming majority of evolutionary biology that has been investigated since 1859 are entirely unaddressed (and therefore unaffected) by Behe’s arguments.

(6) On page 176, Behe concludes that descent with modification from common ancestors is strongly supported by empirical evidence, most of it from biochemistry (specifically comparative sequence data).

(7) Therefore, since Behe accepts common descent and his arguments do not address the overwhelming majority of observations and generalizations (i.e. theories) in evolutionary biology, the whole of his argument devolves to an attack on the non-designed origin of life and biochemical pathways, which may remain forever beyond empirical verification or falsification.

In conclusion, therefore:

(8) The theory of evolution is essentially unaffected by Behe’s arguments and examples in DBB.

(9) A verifiable explanation of the origins of life, the genetic code, and selected biochemical pathways is still an open question, and may continue to remain so for the indefinite future.

(10) Given #8 and #9, neither DBB nor the components of ID theory that are based upon it will (nor indeed can) have any “revolutionary” (or even significant) effect on the science of evolutionary biology.

Which, given the essentially static, non-empirically-verifiable nature of most if ID theory, it can be concluded that ID is not, and probably will not become integrated into the empirical natural sciences.

On page 231 of Michael Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, Behe summarizes his answers to “questions about design” as follows:

The preceding are just the obvious questions that flow from a theory of design. Undoubtedly, more and better-formed questions will be generated as more and more scientists grow curious about design. The theory of intelligent design promises to reinvigorate a field of science grown stale from a lack of viable solutions to dead-end problems. The intellectual competition created by the discovery of design will bring sharper analysis to the professional scientific literature and will require that assertions be backed by hard data. The theory will spark experimental approaches and new hypotheses that would otherwise by untried. A rigorous theory of intelligent design will be a useful tool for the advancement of science in an area that has been moribund for decades. [emphasis added]

Just out of curiosity, what “area of science” is Behe referring to here? I ask because he quite clearly does not identify what area of science he is referring to. Any suggestions?

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